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CHAPTER 4
‘The Rise of the Regulatory Irish State’: 
a response to Colin Scott
Shane Kilcommins and Barry Vaughan1
INTRODUCTION
In chapter three of this book, Professor Colin Scott offers a response
to ‘the concerns that have been expressed concerning the growth in
the use of criminal law as an instrument for empowering State agen-
cies to investigate and prosecute breaches of regulatory rules in
Ireland’. He goes on to suggest: ‘This criticism of the implications of
a growth in the regulatory State in Ireland is most forcibly expressed
in a recent book by Barry Vaughan and Shane Kilcommins, Terrorism,
Rights and the Rule of Law’. According to Scott, our book envisages
that the fabric of the criminal law system might be destroyed by the
growth of regulatory justice. Our analysis is believed to imply that
there is a traditional area of criminal law, grounded in the ascription
of responsibility based on intent and focused on indictable offences
against persons and property. By contrast, Scott argues that the
majority of offences are ‘technical or regulatory in nature’ and carry
no requirement to intent on the part of the alleged perpetrator. On
this basis, he disputes the view imputed to us, namely that regulation
through criminal enforcement is a novel development. If there is
1 Author query? insert biog details
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novelty, it lies in the ‘centralisation of criminal law enforcement and
the emergence of mens rea as a central component of certain serious
criminal offences’. This level of centralisation entails that regulatory
agencies have too little autonomy when they attempt to sanction the
infractions for which they have responsibility for policing. Scott con-
cludes that ‘any reform should prioritise enhancing agency control
over penalties.’
Whilst we would wish to dissociate ourselves from many of the
opinions imputed to us by Scott, his argument still serves a useful
purpose as it allows us to reconsider some of the implications of per-
mitting many regulatory agencies to have a degree of autonomy in
the policing and prosecution of criminal offences. We argue that this
‘dispersal of justice’ carries serious implications for issues of trans-
parency and accountability outside of the ‘traditional’ criminal
justice system and for how it can affect the workings of this system
through a process of normalisation as more strictly instrumental con-
cerns, as opposed to normative, begin to seep in. Whilst the following
sections have a negative purpose in refuting many of the ideas
ascribed to us, they also have a positive function in highlighting
some of the problems associated with the growing presence of the
regulatory impulse within criminal law enforcement. 
THE BASIS OF SCOTT’S CRITIQUE
Professor Scott takes issue with our analysis on five grounds. First
he argues that our approach is one driven by a ‘crime in the streets’
logic. He suggests: 
‘In issuing their complaint, Vaughan and Kilcommins may represent a
large constituency, not only of legal professionals schooled largely in
appellate decisions relating to indictable offences, but also a broader soci-
ety and media, interested and often obsessed with homicide, sexual
offences, robbery and theft. Much of the teaching of criminal law in uni-
versities also shares this focus.’
Secondly, he suggests that our complaints:
‘about this [regulatory] trend include a threat to the centralised monop-
oly over policing and prosecution and the shift away from a fault basis
to criminal law because of the instrumental deployment of criminal law
in regulatory settings on a strict liability basis. It is suggested that the
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worrying trend towards assigning criminal law enforcement functions
to other statutory bodies engaged in economic and social regulation risks
destroying the fabric of the criminal law system.’
Thirdy, he argues that historically we are misinformed in our analy-
sis: 
‘having regard to the longue durée of criminal law history,…if there are
novel elements in contemporary criminal enforcement they do not com-
promise the prosecution of strict liability offences by statutory agencies,
but rather the centralisation of criminal law enforcement and the emer-
gence of mens rea as a central component of certain serious offences’. 
Fourthly, he argues that our ‘complaint…is animated by a concern
about the growth of regulation and regulatory bureaucracies in Ire-
land’. He goes on to suggest: ‘Regulation through criminal
enforcement, however, is far from new’ (regulation through criminal
law enforcement is not a new argument). Finally, he takes issue with
our concern that ‘the instrumental concerns of regulation’ may seep
into ordinary criminal law (the normalisation argument). He argues
that ‘an equally significant risk is that neither prosecuting authorities
nor courts understand the instrumental objectives of regulatory
offences and dilute their stringency, reducing the enforcement capac-
ity of the applicable agencies’. 
It is our contention that Professor Scott’s analysis of our commen-
tary is very selective, and misstates our position. Indeed we would
suggest that he attempts to create a ‘straw man’ argument, designed
to present his own position in a good light whilst misrepresenting
our position. We welcome the opportunity to clarify matters.
At the outset, we should state, as we have documented elsewhere,2
that that we actually welcome the growing use of criminal law in the
regulatory arena. The Irish criminal justice system has been preoc-
cupied with ‘crime in the streets’ (homicides, sexual offences,
offences against property) and has tended to ignore ‘crime in the
suites’ (white-collar crime), the former classified as being seen as
mala in se (moral wrongs) and the latter as mala prohibita (merely pro-
hibited wrongs). The belief was, and is, that white collar crimes,
including corporate and political misconduct, are not real crimes to
2 See, for example, S Kilcommins, ‘Lock up corporate cheats’ Sunday Times 7 June
2009.
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which criminal liability should attach. Rather they are to be viewed
as administrative matters that do not demand stigmatisation or
moral opprobrium. Criminal law is thus rarely used, and in the
extent to which it is, the ultimate resort, prison, is almost never
employed. This is a mistake for a number of reasons.
First, our ordinary criminal justice system is founded on the notion
that public protection and security are ‘essential goods’ that are nec-
essary for our self-preservation, well-being, and happiness. This is
hardly contentious. Most people would agree that we need a system
of justice that will enable us to flourish and go about our lives free
from the threat of injury or harm (such as robberies, rapes, assaults,
burglaries, etc). What is striking, however, is that the perception stills
exists in Ireland that white collar crime does not threaten our security
in the same way that street crime does. This is a fallacy. Though it
may appear more remote, more victimless and may often be less dra-
matic, misconduct in the banking and corporate sectors, in the
workplace, in the environment, in the political arena and in the dis-
tortion of competition in the market poses as much, if not more, of a
threat to our everyday lives as ordinary crime (with the potential to
affect more people). Our security can be affected in a myriad of dif-
ferent ways by misconduct of this nature including, among other
things, workplace injuries, loss of equal opportunity, loss of compe-
tition, loss of jobs, loss of reputation and the consequent devaluation
of share prices and pension funds, threats to the environment,
increased taxation, and increased costs for consumers. To-date, we
have adopted a very narrow understanding of what constitutes a
threat to our security, fastened to a very traditional outlook that
views white collar wrongdoing as having rather benign effects. We
quickly need to develop a more nuanced understanding that jettisons
such traditional thinking. 
Once we recognise the seriousness of white collar wrongdoing,
then we must also recognise that compliance strategies alone cannot
best guarantee our security. A compliance model of justice (negoti-
ation, persuasion, and so on) speaks primarily to the ‘good man’
(who seeks to act in good faith and employs the law as a normative
guide to conduct and action), not the ‘bad man’ who seeks to evade
the strictures of the law. In Ireland, and as regards white collar
wrongdoing, we seem to have operated for the most part along the
dimension of persuading, never punishing (even though we have
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the criminal sanctioning tools in place). In order to encapsulate both
forms of conduct, the compliance model must also be supported by
a sanctioning model that includes the use of imprisonment. 
To suggest otherwise would be to endorse a two-tier system of jus-
tice, something which would make a mockery of the notion of
equality for all citizens before the law. If we accept the potential
deterrent possibilities of imprisoning offenders for ordinary, often
less serious, street crimes, then as a matter of principle we have to
be prepared to accept that prison can also act as a similar deterrent
for very serious white collar wrongdoing. Though our criminal jus-
tice system, in its ideology and generality, is geared towards the
notion of being class neutral, the reality is somewhat different. To-
date, white collar wrongdoers have been immunised from the full
reach of our ordinary criminal justice system, whereas the poorer
classes are disproportionately represented. Having recognised that
serious white collar wrongdoing does threaten our security, we must
be more prepared to use the full array of criminal sanctions–which
are already on our statute books–against those who engage in it. For
too long a culture has existed which has facilitated the creation of a
two-tiered justice system where white-collar crime is treated with
penal impunity whereas a whole architecture of increasingly repres-
sive responses have been drawn up to tackle the problem of street
crime.
Finally, we should not underestimate the powerful cathartic effects
that the proper use of criminal law can provide in society Many Irish
citizens have grown weary of ‘wink and nod’ politics, ‘golden cir-
cles’, ‘golden handshakes’, massive spends on tribunals with little
or no real consequences, and the degree to which the rich and pow-
erful appear to be immunised from the full reach of the law. In these
circumstances the criminal law–and the punishments that follow it–
can act as a platform for the expression of collective outrage .The
criminal law is designed to uphold moral sensibilities and it permits
a powerful message to be conveyed in relation to the anger felt by
ordinary citizens about the commission of certain crimes. It also acts
as an important safety valve, limiting the ‘demoralising effects’ on
society of the consequences of serious misconduct. Of course, in
saying this, we should be careful not to employ the criminal law to
scapegoat individuals, to facilitate intolerance and repression, or to
punish excessively. The courts, however, have developed a compre-
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hensive jurisprudence (largely in the street crime field) for ensuring
fairness of procedures and proportionately of punishments which
should allay any concerns we have in this regard. 
As such, we must recognise that white collar wrongdoing has very
serious consequences for all of us. Our actual security depends
greatly on how committed we are to tackling it particularly at an
institutional level. Though we should continue to foster compliance
strategies where appropriate, we must also be committed to support-
ing criminal sanctioning strategies that send out the message to
white collar criminals that their wrongdoing is treated seriously by
us as a society and will, if the circumstances warrant it, result in
imprisonment like it does for street crimes. A recent decision by our
criminal courts touches upon this very point and may be indicative
of the fledgling emergence of a new approach to tackling white collar
crime. In late March of this year, Mr Justice McKechnie, in an excel-
lent judgment in the Central Criminal Court which considered
competition law abuses by an association of Citroen car dealers
noted: 
‘These [offences] stifle competition and discourage new entrants, dam-
aging economic and commercial liberty…[T]hey remove price choice
from the consumer, deter consumer interest in product purchase and dis-
courage variety. They reduce incentives to compete and hamper
invention…If previously our society did not frown upon this type of con-
duct, as it did in respect of more conventional crime, that forbearance or
tolerance has eroded swiftly, as the benefits of competition law become
clearer…Therefore it must be realised that serious breaches of the code
have to attract serious punishment [which included imprisonment]’.3
Though deeply engrained tradition is hard to set aside, imprison-
ment may soon become a realistic possibility for all forms of serious
wrongdoing in Ireland. 
THE PURPOSE OF OUR ANALYSIS IN TERRORISM, RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW
To be clear about our position, it is necessary to clarify the purpose
of our analysis of regulatory crime in Terrorism, Rights and the Rule of
3 See DPP v Duffy and Duffy Motors (unreported, Central Criminal Court, 23 March
2009). See also DPP v Manning (unreported, High Court, 9 February, 2007). 
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Law.4 In chapters 5 and 6 of the book, we argued that ‘culture of con-
trol/crime control’ narratives were too unidirectional and
one-dimensional in describing a perceived drift towards more
authoritarian control, underplaying the embedded constituents of
the criminal process. In chapter 5, for example, we pointed to the
institutionalised nature of accused rights which, we argue, remain
very much part of the topography of the criminal process in Ireland,
carrying a threshold weight ‘which the government is required to
respect case by case, decision by decision’.5 In chapter 6, we docu-
ment what we perceive as the increasingly disaggregated and
contradictory nature of justice in the early twenty-first century. On
the one hand, we highlight the ‘tooling up’ of the State in the ordi-
nary criminal justice system including increased Garda powers,
restrictions on the right to silence and bail, and legislative attempts
to reduce the art of sentencing to a more Procrustean formula that
mechanically fits punishment to crime (these developments fit neatly
with crime control analyses). We also noted that the employment of
the criminal law as the monopoly mechanism for dealing with
deviant behaviour was beginning to fragment and blur. This diver-
sification and diffusion of the State into the civil sphere is also
consistent with crime control analyses. But we also then point to
other phenomena which are not consistent with the trajectory
espoused by those who argue that we live in a ‘culture of control
society’. These included the rise of the regulatory Irish State (which
the rest of this chapter will focus on) and the increased sensitivity of
the criminal justice system to the needs and concerns of victims of
crime. In respect of this latter category, we noted: ‘victim ideology
is not just the manifestation of a sinister State or the product of media
exaggerated alarm about law and order. Instead its recent emergence
must be seen much more as a response to a previous scandalous neg-
lect, as a justified attempt to correct an imbalance in which the victim
was constituted as a ‘silent abstraction, a background figure whose
individuality hardly registered’.6
Our analysis of regulatory crime was thus employed to demon-
strate the fragmented nature of contemporary justice, something not
4 Willan Publishing (Willan Publishing: Devon, 2007).
5 R Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007 repr), 223. 
6 Op. cit., 150.
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readily apparent in crime control literature. We reasoned as follows
in the introduction to chapter 6, Disaggregated Justice, in which our
analysis of regulation appears:
‘Justice in the early 21st century is thus becoming more disaggregated
and more contradictory. It is more principled but also more repressive,
more instrumental but also more expressive. It involves more normative
legitimacy for rights based discourse, but also more normalisation of the
“sites of exception”. It continues to emphasise protection from the State,
but increasingly also protection by the State. It is more inclusionary in
seeking to accommodate victims, witnesses and local communities but
also more exclusionary through, among other things, the expressive tone
adopted in respect of offenders and those accused of crime. It embodies
more authoritarianism but also more pluralism. It is more supra-national
but also more local, more statist but also more globalised. It continues to
emphasise adversarialism, but also encourages executive fact-finding
and guilt determination in non-court settings. It involves more monop-
olised criminal control but also more fragmentation and blurring of
boundaries. It is more focused on the poor and socially excluded but it
also appears to be directing its gaze at white collar crime.’7
In particular, we identified a number of characteristics about the use
of regulatory strategies in Ireland. First we noted that ‘more and
more we are witnessing the increasing and extensive use regulatory
strategies by the Irish State’.8 Secondly we suggested that distinctions
have traditionally been drawn between regulatory crimes and ordi-
nary crimes on the basis that the former are mala prohibita and the
latter are male in se. Thirdly we noted that regulatory agencies con-
stituted an enlargement in the scope of State power, albeit that they
occupied ‘diverse sites and modes of operation’.9 Fourthly we argued
‘that many aspects of regulatory crime operate in opposition to the
general trend of paradigmatic criminal law which permits general
defences, demands both a conduct and a fault element, and respects
procedural standards such as a legal burden of proof beyond rea-
sonable doubt’.10 As part of this argument, we noted that any
defences that might exist in the regulatory arena are also more spe-
cialised than might be the case in the general defences that apply in
7 Op. cit., 121.
8 Op. cit, 138.
9 Op. cit., 140.
10 Ibid.
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the ordinary criminal law system. In particular we cited the law on
competition, where it is a specific defence to show that the agree-
ment, decision or concerted practice complained of benefited from a
declaration from the Competition Authority that the practice com-
plained of contributes to improvement in the production or
distribution of goods and services, or promotes technical or eco-
nomic progress. Fifthly, we noted that many regulatory agencies had
very wide powers of entry, inspection, examination, search, seizure
and analysis. Sixth, we noted that there is also some evidence of a
possible drift towards a more punitive approach to regulation,
though we urged caution in this regard given that the area of crimi-
nal regulation remains predominantly orientated towards a
compliance model of enforcement. Finally, we alluded to the prolif-
eration of hybrid enforcement mechanisms that can be employed by
regulatory agencies. These observations were designed to demon-
strate how the ‘narrow exclusivity’ of crime control analyses,
focusing predominantly on crime in the streets, was a mistake. In
many respects they accord with the views of Colin Scott given that
he too recognises:
• ‘[that] it is clear that there has been an exponential growth in the
number of such [regulatory] agencies in Ireland, many of which
have criminal law responsibilities.’ 
• the ‘broader international pattern towards more punitive regu-
latory penalties and enforcement’.
• the distinction between ‘offences which are mala in se and mala
prohibita.’ 
• the idea that regulatory crime, in contrast to real crime, ‘is eval-
uated by reference to more utilitarian concepts of efficiency and
effectiveness of regulatory regimes, typically prioritising the
understanding of enforcement, over the normative complexity
of the (sic) legal concepts such as intent’ (this is the same point
that we made about regulatory crime operating in opposition to
the general trend of paradigmatic criminal law);
• that regulatory crime ‘is often accompanied by the creation of
statutory defences’11 (citing the due diligence defence under sec-
tion 78 of the Consumer Protection Act 2007)
11 Professor Scott uses the term ‘statutory’ defences, but it is perhaps more appro-
priate to use the word ‘specialised’, since many of the general defences, such as
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• that ‘many enforcement agencies …develop practices in which
prosecution is very much the exception or ‘last resort’ in an array
of strategies for promoting compliance’. 
With this in mind, let us now turn to address the specific criticisms 
Our ‘Crime in Streets’ Obsession 
As noted above, Professor Scott argues that our approach is one
driven by a ‘crime in the streets’ logic. He suggests: ‘In issuing their
complaint Vaughan and Kilcommins may represent a large con-
stituency, not only of legal professionals schooled largely in
appellate decisions relating to indictable offences, but also a broader
society and media, interested and often obsessed with homicide,
sexual offences, robbery and theft. Much of the teaching of criminal
law in universities also shares this focus.’ We were surprised by this
argument, particularly given what we actually stated in our eight
page analysis of regulatory crime, the purpose of which was to
demonstrate that the rise of regulatory strategies did not fit the pic-
ture depicted of contemporary developments in criminal justice by
crime control analyses. Our opening paragraph of the section read
as follows:
‘In examining the contours of the penal complex, criminologists and
penologists are often drawn to traditional “real crime” (homicides, vio-
lent assaults, organised crime, sexual offences, requirements of mens rea
and actus reus, and general defences) whilst ignoring regulatory offences
which are often enforced by specialist agencies. They have tended to be
preoccupied with the punitive regulation of the poor–a project closely
tied to a police-prisons way of knowing–that focuses on “crime in the
streets” rather than “crime in the suites”…The narrow exclusivity of this
approach is a mistake because regulatory criminal law is becoming
increasingly influential, not least because criminalisation is now more
than ever viewed as a panacea for almost any social problem…More and
more we are witnessing the increasing and extensive use of regulatory
strategies by the Irish State. In areas such as competition law, environ-
mental protection, health and safety law, and consumer and corporate
affairs, there has been a move towards using criminalisation as the last-
self-defence, insanity, and diminished responsibility, are now provided for in
statute. 
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resort strategy when compliance through negotiation and monitoring
has failed.’12
It is difficult, we feel, to be more explicit than this. We expressly
acknowledge that the narrow exclusivity of focusing solely on ‘real
crime’ is a mistake. It is this precise reason that we introduced a sec-
tion on regulatory crime so as to point to a gap in crime control
literature. Moreover the use the phrase ‘paradigmatic criminal law’
(at p. 140 in the book) was employed to highlight the notion that reg-
ulatory crime remains marginalised. All of this seems to support the
point that Colin Scott is making – an over emphasis on real crime
(though he makes the claim only in respect of criminal lawyers). In
short, we are surprised by this criticism. We have introduced a sec-
tion on regulatory crime in the book to highlight the over emphasis
on ‘crime in the streets’ by crime control theorists, only to be criti-
cised by Colin Scott for adopting a ‘crime in the streets’ logic! 
The threats to centralised monopoly over policing and prosecution and
the destruction of the fabric of our criminal law
Professor Scott argues that we make the following complaint about
the growth of the regulatory State in Ireland:
‘Their complaints about this trend include a threat to the centralised
monopoly over policing and prosecution and the shift from a fault basis
of criminal law because of the instrumental deployment of criminal law
in regulatory settings on a strict liability basis. It is suggested that this
worrying trend towards assigning criminal law enforcement functions
to other statutory bodies engaged in economic and social regulation risks
destroying the fabric of the criminal law system.’
Again, we would argue that this is a misrepresentation of what we
actually stated. As noted above, our purpose in examining regula-
tory criminal law was to highlight the point that many commentators
seeking to write ‘histories of the present’ of the criminal justice com-
plex were preoccupied with the punitive regulation of the poor. We
went on to note that we believed ‘this was a mistake because regu-
latory criminal law is becoming increasingly influential’.13 In
12 Op. cit., 138.
13 Ibid.
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addition, we noted that the current use of regulatory strategies in
Ireland had a ‘number of interesting characteristics’ including the
fact that they can be seen as part of a pattern of more governance,
the fact that many aspects of regulatory criminal law operate in
opposition to the general trend of paradigmatic criminal law, the
wide powers of entry, search and seizure given to may regulatory
agencies, the drift towards a more punitive approach to regulation,
and the proliferation of hybrid enforcement mechanisms. In making
these observations, we outline only two points of caution about the
use of these regulatory strategies in Ireland, the first relating to gov-
ernance, the second relating to normalisation. In relation to
governance, we stated:
‘[T]he emergence of this regulatory criminal framework is significantly
different from the unified monopolies of centralised control underpin-
ning policing and prosecution in the modern State. Arguably these new
techniques and strategies can be seen as part of more (rather than less)
governance, but taking “decentred”, “at-a-distance” forms.’14
We went on to note: 
‘Now, however, the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions is, to
some extent, increasingly losing its monopoly role. The number of
administrative agencies that have entered the criminal justice arena,
colonising the power to investigate regulatory crimes in specific areas
and to prosecute summarily, has increased dramatically in recent years.
They include the Competition Authority, the Director of Consumer
Affairs, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Health and Safety
Authority, and the Office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement. Sig-
nificantly, the agencies have both investigative and prosecution functions,
with each pursuing their own agendas, policies and practices. All this
represents more criminal regulation by the State (as well as of the State),
rather than any “hollowing out” of the State.’ 
Scott argues that we view this trend as a threat to the centralised
monopoly over policing and prosecution. But we never made this
claim. We merely argued that the trend constituted more rather than
less governance. Our one criticism of this increasing governance is
the lack of unity and coherency across the agencies:
14 Op. cit, 138-139.
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‘This enlargement in scope, however, is fragmented in nature, occupying
diverse sites and modes of operation. Despite extensive powers to share
information, there is no unifying strategy across the agencies or with
other law enforcement institutions such as the DPP or Gardaí. Staffing
levels, resources, workloads and working practices vary from agency to
agency. Indeed, and apart from respective annual reports, there is little
in the way of an accountability structure overseeing the policy choices
of the various regulatory agencies, the manner in which they invoke their
considerable investigative and enforcement powers, or the way in which
information is shared between them and the Gardaí.15
As such, and to be clear, we are not interested–and make no claims–
as to whether these regulatory agencies represent a threat to the
previous centralised monopoly of policing and prosecution, namely
the Gardaí and the DPP. What we are saying is that these new devel-
opments which permit more agencies to investigate and prosecute
crime disrupts that older pattern and constitutes more governance,
albeit that it is governance of a fragmented rather than monolithic
variety. 
Scott also argues that we make the claim that regulatory criminal
law risks destroying the fabric of our criminal law. We never make
this claim and find it frustrating to have to rebut such a contention.
In a paragraph in the section on regulatory crime we document how
a distinction has been drawn between regulatory crimes and ordi-
nary crimes, noting that regulatory crimes could be thought of in
‘instrumental means-ends terms’, and as not ‘attracting significant
moral opprobrium’.16 We have no difficulty with the ‘instrumental
mentality’ underpinning much of the regulatory criminal frame-
work, including the employment of ‘reverse onus’ provisions,
‘instrumental fault element requirements’, and specialised defences.
This instrumental mentality operates quiet well in an environment
predominantly orientated towards a compliance model of enforce-
ment. Our concern related to the potential for this instrumental
mentality to become more normalised in the ordinary criminal justice
15 Op. cit., 140. The limited staffing resources at the Office of the Director of Cor-
porate Enforcement, for example, has impeded the agency’s ability to tackle
regulatory crime in the corporate sector. See, ‘Key “Golden Circle” files secured
in Anglo Swoop’ Irish Independent, 26 February 2009. 
16 In a footnote in this paragraph, we raised the issue of labelling. 
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system, a system predominantly orientated towards a sanctioning
model of enforcement (what we termed a ‘police-prisons way of
knowing’). Though many of us may embrace the employment of an
instrumental logic in the regulatory criminal arena (‘to make up for
expected difficulties of proof in difficult cases’), how can we be sure
that the logic will be confined to this arena? 
This issue of normalisation, and our concerns in relation to it, must
be understood in the context of an earlier chapter in our book, Law
in the Shadow of a Gunman, in which we teased out the impact that
the long history of emergency laws had on the ordinary criminal
process (specifically in relation to Garda information gathering tac-
tics, powers of arrest and detention, non-jury courts, and seizing
criminal assets without requiring a criminal conviction) and the
‘metaphoric pathways’ created between terrorism and ordinary
crime. We suggested:
‘The somewhat unique position of Ireland as regards its extraordinary
legal powers raises interesting questions about the pursuit of the rule of
law in a liberal democracy. Special zones were set up in which normal
laws did not apply. As a result of public and political pressure, this zone
expanded to incorporate more and more normal crime. There was not
one supreme moment of sovereignty in which laws were suspended;
rather the normalisation of the exception was achieved through a steady
accretion of views that go largely unchallenged. The upshot is that a par-
tial post-constitutional coma has occurred in which it is unclear whether
the “Law is King” or the “King is Law”.’17
Given the seepage of extraordinary measures into the ordinary crim-
inal law, which we documented, it is not surprising that we should
issue a caution relating to the normalisation potential of the instru-
mentalism underpinning regulatory criminal law. This is what we
stated: ‘It remains a matter of speculation the extent to which the
instrumental mentality underpinning much of the regulatory frame-
work will seep into paradigmatic criminal law and be employed to
undermine further the doctrinal reasoning that supports many of the
due process protections operating in that domain’.18 We went on to
note that we should be aware of the potential for the instrumentalism
17 Op. cit., 92
18 Op. cit., 140
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of regulation to become normalised in paradigmatic criminal law.19
Scott, on the other hand, argues that the orthodoxy of the ordinary
system [paradigmatic criminal law] will dilute the instrumentalism
inherent in the regulatory arena causing inefficiency. The direction
(if any) of this normalisation–from the regulatory into the ordinary
criminal law system or from the ordinary into the regulatory–will
become clearer in the years to come. But there are two points we
would like to make about Scott’s claim at this juncture. 
First, the fact that Scott prioritises mens rea conditions him to argue
that this mental element tempers the decision-making of courts,
causing them to look for intention even with offences of strict liabil-
ity, and causing the regulatory authorities to pass onto the
prosecutors those offences that are most like real crimes in terms of
harm and culpability. This causes uncertainty with regard to the
credibility of regulatory enforcement. There is a curious duality to
Scott’s argument. On the one hand, he argues that the practice of
criminal law enforcement is dominated by the prosecution of tech-
nical offences on the basis of strict liability rather than being based
on the prosecution of ‘real’ crimes relying on the adduction of intent.
But on the other hand, he argues that it is this latter paradigm of
criminal law which dominates, however inappropriately, the prac-
tice of regulatory enforcement. It would seem that Scott is reasserting
the predominance of the mens rea paradigm despite contending that
it is marginal to criminal law. 
In addition, and though it is true that mens rea ‘must be presumed
to be a necessary ingredient of all serious offences’,20 there is also
some Irish and ECHR support for the view that a defence of due dili-
gence will suffice to justify a regulatory offence of strict liability.21
19 For an illustration of this possibility in relation to the Criminal Assets Bureau,
see B Vaughan ‘The Maginot Line of Irish Criminology Part II: Outflanked by the
Regulatory Impulse?’ Irish Criminal Law Journal (2009): 19(3): 66-70.
20 See, for example, C v Ireland and Others [2006] IESC 33; The Employment Equality
Bill 1996 [1997] 2 IR 321; and Brady v Environmental Protection Agency [2007] IEHC
58.
21 In C v Ireland and Others [2006] IESC 33, for example, this was suggested by
Hardiman J in passing (though he did not rule specifically on the matter). In par-
ticular he referred to the cases of Regina v City of Sault Sainte Marine [1978] 85 DLR
161 and the dissenting judgment of Keane J in Shannon Regional Fisheries Board v
Cavan County Council [1996] 3 IR 267. Moreover, the decision of Shannon Regional
Fisheries Board v Cavan County Council, which held that there was no requirement
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This may provide some degree of leeway for crimes that can be clas-
sified as regulatory in nature, something not recognised by Scott in
his paper. Moreover Scott also ignores the fact that even for serious
conventional crimes such as an assault causing harm, the courts have
been willing to interpret the relevant statutory provision as not
having a mens rea requirement.22 Thus in assuming that the safe-
guards underpinning conventional crime will act as a check on the
instrumentalism that drives the regulatory arena, Scott, it can be
argued, downplays the degree of uncertainty that continues to exist
in relation to serious regulatory wrongdoing, and, more generally,
the extent to which the relevant legal rules are contingent upon inter-
pretation, are not always logically consistent, and provoke
disagreement about their weight. 
That we are historically misinformed having regard the centralisation of
criminal law enforcement and the emergence of mens rea as a central
component of certain serious offences. 
Professor Scott argues that our analysis is misinformed and that we
fail to appreciate that if there are ‘novel elements in contemporary
criminal law enforcement’, ‘they relate to the centralisation of crim-
inal law enforcement and the emergence of mens rea as a central
component of certain serious criminal offences’. Again, we are sur-
of a mens rea element for regulatory offences, has not been expressly overruled by
the judgment in C. In terms of ECHR jurisprudence, in Salabiaku v France (1998)
EHRR 379, the European Court of Human Rights held that ‘the contracting States
may, under certain conditions, penalise a simple or objective fact as such irrespec-
tive of whether it results from criminal intent or from negligence’. It went on to
note however that presumptions of fact or law should be confined within ‘reason-
able limits’.
22 See, for example, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform v Dolny [2009] IESC
48; Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform v Dolny [2008] IEHC 326. See also
DPP v Power [2007] IESC 31 where the Supreme Court held that in the prosecution
of an offence under s 15A of the Misuse of Drugs Acts, it was not necessary for the
prosecution to prove that the accused knew or ought to have known the market
value of the controlled drug amounted to €13,000 or more. More generally, see
Lacey who has argued that ‘we are seeing a reversal of the slow trend towards
capacity-responsibility [defined in strict legal terms as mens rea] in English criminal
law from the early Nineteenth to the mid-Twentieth Centuries’. N Lacey, ‘Space,
Time and Function: intersecting principles of responsibility across the terrain of
criminal justice’ Criminal Law and Philosophy (2007) 1(3): 233-250 at 249. 
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prised by this criticism given that we spent an entire chapter docu-
menting ‘how the paradigm of prosecuting and investigating crime
moved from an intensely local, unstructured and victim-precipitated
arrangement–where it was incumbent on the accused to actively par-
ticipate in the proceedings–to a structured, adversarial,
State-monopolised event where the accused was largely silenced in
the courtroom’.23 In the chapter we mapped the gradual shift from
sovereignty to government; from a ‘badly regulated distribution of
power’24 to a new technique of criminal and penal semiotics which
‘discarded the inefficient use of discretionary violence; and from a
penal economy of ‘expenditure and excess’ to one of ‘continuity and
permanence’.25 For example, after expressly documenting the emer-
gence of centralised schemes of prosecution in Ireland in 1801,26 we
went on to note: 
‘Violence and justice were now to a greater extent monopolised by the
central authorities. The era of victim justice as “accommodation” and
theatre was at an end. Conflicts were no longer viewed as the property
of the parties most directly affected. Previously strong stakeholder inter-
ests such as victims and the local community were gradually colonised
in the course of the nineteenth century by a State apparatus that acted
for rather than with the public.’27
Later in the same chapter, we stated:
‘Thus in the course of the nineteenth century, the criminal complex was
gradually redrawn as a new statist administrative machinery emerged
for investigating, prosecuting and punishing crime. The penal field
increasingly disassociated itself from the local, personal and arbitrary
confrontations that governed criminal relations in the eighteenth century
and became a more depersonalised, rule-governed affair with the State
at the centre. Private disputes and vendettas were gradually monopo-
lised by the State apparatus and rerouted into the courtroom.’28
23 Op. cit., 41.
24 M Foucault, Discipline and Punish: the birth of the prison (Harmonsworth: Penguin,
1991 repr.), 79
25 Op. cit., 56 and 64.
26 We documented the emergence of a centralised police force at 58.
27 Op. cit, 62
28 Op. cit., 64
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Moreover, as we documented the shift from an exculpatory to incul-
patory model of justice in the late eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, we noted the following in terms of the issues of personal
autonomy and mens re:
‘[T]he old hierarchical order of patronage was increasingly being under-
mined by a classical liberalist and utilitarian belief in the free
individual…The ascriptive status of individuals under the old hierarchi-
cal model of authority, where individuality was to some extent
subsumed into a person’s attachment to a particular location, grouping,
and placement within that grouping, was overtaken by a new horizontal
vision that emphasised rationalism, liberalism, egalitarianism, and free-
dom…In contrast to the fixed identities fashioned by pre-modern status
relationships, modern progressive societies were viewed as oscillating
more towards relations that recognised the importance of individualism
and individual autonomy. Anchored to a Cartesian subject, the self-
determining tendencies of contract now replaced status as one of the
organising principles of society…Lea refers to this process of “criminal-
ising abstraction” – abstracting an accused’s criminality from the
complex of other characteristics which make him what he is – as one of
the foundation stones of modern criminal law and criminal justice…’.29
We then went on to note:
‘Criminal law also underwent reform to become a more rigid and impar-
tial set of prescriptions that purportedly bound al members in the same
manner… Increasingly its focus moved away from the notion of “mani-
fest criminality” based on the disposition of the accused to a more
formalised conception of criminal liability. Hierarchy, status and patron-
age had no place under this rule of law vista which advocated certainty,
coherence and systematic application. The initial anchoring point of this
more rationalised approach to criminal law was the “reasonable man”,
a responsible, rational, self-disciplining subject who, it was thought, was
capable of being deterred by a properly prescribed system of criminal
laws and a tariff of enforced sanctions. [We inserted a footnote at this
point which read as follows: “In time, more subjective principles of crim-
inal responsibility would develop around concepts such a intent,
recklessness, belief and knowledge”]. This more codified approach to
law also impacted on the image of the human subject who increasingly
came to be constituted as a rational, autonomous and self-governing
29 Op. cit., 58, 59.
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being. As Wiener noted: “The ideal of the responsible individual came
to stand ever more at the centre of the law. Its administration was over-
hauled to better embody the assumption that the members of the general
public were to be considered more rational and responsible than they
had been hitherto…A crucial supposition underlying early Victorian law
reform was that the most urgent need was to make people self-governing
and that the best way to do so was to hold them, sternly and unblink-
ingly, responsible for the consequences of their actions”.’30
It is difficult to see in the circumstances how Scott could argue that
we were not aware of these elements of centralisation and mens rea
having regard to, as he suggests, the longue durée of criminal law his-
tory’. Moreover, and apart from his failure to document our
argument properly, we believe that his claim–that the only ‘novel’
elements in the longue durée of criminal law history relate to ‘the cen-
tralisation of criminal law enforcement and the emergence of mens
rea as a central component of certain serious offences’–is historically
naïve, demonstrating a very superficial understanding of the trans-
formations that have taken place in the criminal justice system. In
the shift from an exculpatory to inculpatory model of justice, we
would argue, inter alia, that all of the following constituted novel ele-
ments: the lawyerisation of the criminal process, the logic of
adversarialism that unfolded, the removal of the ‘personal elements
from the workings of the law’, the creation of the accused as an
abstract juridical subject, the expansion in the exclusionary rules of
evidence, the changing role of the judge at trial, and the displacement
of the victim from centre-stage to bit-part role in the criminal process.
Moreover, in only focusing on centralisation and mens rea, Scott has
glossed over the emergence of the prison31 as the central element in
the sanctioning system by roughly the mid-nineteenth century, and
the emergence of a more individuated justice system in the late nine-
teenth century.32 These also constituted ‘novel’ elements in criminal
law enforcement. In terms of individuated justice, for example, we
noted:
30 Op. cit., 62
31 Foucault is perhaps the most famous account documenting the transition from
a corporal to carceral society. 
32 See, for example, D Garland, Punishment and Welfare (Aldershot: Gower, 1985).
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‘Sentencing in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries gradually
extricated itself from the assumptions and commitments underpinning
mid nineteenth century sentencing practices (individualism, the ration-
ality of offenders and a focus on the proximal conditions of crime) to
become a more “knowledgeable form of regulation” (with an emphasis
on individualisation, the distal conditions of crime, and the creation of a
plethora of ‘non-equivalent’ disposals)…Law was being socialised and
this had important consequences for the modern sentencing model of
justice. Increasingly the notion that “man was a free moral agent with
power to choose what he would do and a responsibility coincident with
that power” seemed illusionary, not least because of developments in
science and criminology…Saleilles referred to this new archetype of sen-
tencing in the following terms: “punishment is to be determined not by
the moral gravity of the crime, not by the injury done, but by the nature
of the criminal”.’33
Regulation is not new
Scott also argued that our ‘complaint…is animated by a concern
about the growth of regulation and regulatory bureaucracies in Ire-
land’ and, accordingly, we failed to appreciate that ‘[r]egulation
through criminal law enforcement…is far from new’. Again we were
surprised by this claim, particularly given the fact that we specifi-
cally addressed this issue. In the third paragraph of our analysis on
regulatory crime, we noted the following:
‘Prior to the nineteenth century, the institution of local policing was heav-
ily orientated towards the ‘creation of an orderly environment, especially
for trade and commerce’…It did not focus exclusively on offences against
persons and property, but also included the regulation ‘customs, trade,
highways, foodstuffs, health, labour standards, fire, forests and hunting,
street life, migration and immigration communities’…Throughout the
nineteenth century, however, and as we noted in a previous chapter, the
State very gradually began to monopolise and separate the prosecutorial
and policing functions, particularly for serious crimes. In terms of polic-
ing, this meant the following [quoting Braithwaite]:
“Uniformed paramilitary police, preoccupied with the punitive regula-
tion of the poor to the almost total exclusion of any interest in the
33 Op. cit., 64-65.
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constitution of markets and the just regulation of commerce, became one
of the most universal of globalised regulatory models. So what happened
to the business regulation? From the mid-19th century, factories inspec-
torates, mines inspectorates, liquor licensing boards, weights and
measures inspectorates, health and sanitation, food inspectorates and
countless others were created to begin to fill the vacuum left by consta-
bles now concentrating only on crime. Business regulation became
variegated into many specialist regulatory branches.34
Given this text, it seems impossible in the circumstances to make the
claim that we were unaware of the history of regulation through
criminal enforcement. What we were saying is that the scale rather
than the fact of regulation is novel. It is not clear whether Scott would
disagree as he admits that ‘whilst regulatory agencies have existed
from before the foundation of the State it is clear that there has been
an exponential growth in the numbers of such agencies in Ireland,
many of which have criminal law responsibilities’. Evidence pro-
vided by him demonstrates that the number of such agencies has
risen threefold over the last two decades (see Figure 1 in Scott). 
MORE GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
Scott uses history as one tool of analysis to critique out commentary
on regulatory crime. We have dealt with the specific details of his
argument as it relates to history in part c of this paper. We do how-
ever have two observations we would like to make about his own
interpretations of history (in addition to earlier observations that we
have made in part c about the credibility of some of his own histor-
ical claims). In his paper, Scott employs Fernand Braudel’s famous
34 Op. cit., 139. In a footnote immediately following the above quotation, the fol-
lowing text appears: ‘On the rise of administrative justice through boards,
inspectors and commissions, see Pound…who noted : “In the case of factory acts,
housing laws, pure food laws, laws for protection against fire and sanitary laws,
today we commonly remove the whole subject in substance form the domain of
judicial prosecution and turn it over to boards and commissions, to be dealt with
by inspectors and secretaries and agents.”…The nature of the distinction between
the criminal and administrative functions of the police has however been over-
simplified. In Ireland, for example, the Gardaí continued to carry out a range of
administrative duties, including the collection of agricultural statistics and the
delivery of old-age pension books right, for much of the twentieth century…’.
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phrase, la longue durée, implying an appreciation of historical tempos
and contextualisation. Yet in footnote 12 he notes the following: 
‘See…The Myth of Private Prosecution in England, 1750-1850…which
focuses on offences concerning the theft of lead created by 4 Geo. IV c.
33 (1731) which, by their nature were difficult to prosecute if an individ-
ual had to identify the particular lead of which they had been deprived
in order to ground a prosecution’. 
Scott then goes on to suggest: 
‘The legislation anticipated proceeds of crime legislation in that it created
a presumption that persons carrying such items as roofing lead had
stolen it, unless they could otherwise account for their possession of it’. 
To our minds, this statement shows very little appreciation of the
legal and historical contingencies of the relevant statutes. At a surface
legal level, it is hard to see how a statute of 1731 which criminalises
the possession of lead has any connection with proceeds of crime
legislation from 1996 which expressly does not require proof of any
criminal offence.35 More significantly, suggesting that a criminal
statute in 1731 anticipated the introduction of proceeds of crime leg-
islation is hopelessly broad and historically naïve. In particular, it
gives rise to the methodological problem of present-centredness,
with the tendency to view history as an ‘unfolding logic’. It distorts
the contemporary significance and character of proceeds of crime
legislation whilst also obscuring the contextual significance and
usage of the 1731 statute.36 We would argue that the relatively recent
35 The 1731 statute appears to create a possession offence with an in-built ‘reverse
onus’ provision. Though not relevant in the context of the current discussion, such
a configuration has continued to endure for some possession offences. See, for
example, s 4 of the Explosive Substances Act 1883 as interpreted in Hardy v Ireland
[1994] 2 IR 550. 
36 On whiggism, see H. Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History (London: G
Bell and Sons, 1963 repr). See also S Kilcommins, ‘Impressment and its genealogical
claims in respect of community service orders in England and Wales’ Irish Jurist
(1999) XXXIV: 223-255, and Q. Skinner, ‘Meaning and Understanding in the His-
tory of Ideas’ History and Theory (1969) Vol VIII: 1-53. On lawyers and their use of
history, see Robert Gordon, who noted: “Lawyers are monists, historians are plu-
ralists–i.e. lawyers want to recover a single authoritative meaning from a past act
or practice, while historians look for plural, contested, or ambiguous meanings.
Lawyers are overly presentist: They want to bring past practices into the present
to serve present purposes, whereas historians regard naked presentism as a sin…
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embrace of civil measures such as proceeds of crime legislation must
be understood in the context of the contemporary perceived ineffec-
tiveness of the criminal law mechanism. As we noted in Terrorism,
Rights and the Rule of Law:
‘The principled protections of the criminal process – premised on a crim-
inal sanctioning model of justice – can more easily be circumvented by
directing the flow of power into this parallel system of civil justice.
Though this phenomenon is rapidly occurring, our due process defences
have remained static, firmly fastened to the place inhabited by criminal
law. They remain enmeshed in the fixity of definition and are incapable
of contending with the plasticity and fluidity of the flow of power into
civil spaces’.37
We went on to note:
‘Such measures [such as proceeds of crime legislation] might best be
described as falling under a schema of criminal administration, a cost
efficient form of legitimate coercion that jettisons the orthodox safe-
guards of criminal law (the requirements of criminal guilt, proof beyond
reasonable doubt, obligations of discovery in criminal proceedings, pro-
portionality to offence seriousness, and the presumption of innocence)
but continues to embody criminal indicia including the moral oppro-
brium associated with the prohibited conduct and the capacity of the
measures to stigmatise. In addition to the absence of safeguards, this
schema also, however, displays another important difference from tra-
ditional criminal law. Provisions that seize or tax the proceeds of crime
are not designed to reorientate human behaviour or to reintegrate those
that are deviant. Instead their focus is more “apersonal” in orientation
(albeit it with the sanctioning potential to stigmatise and exclude)…They
are tailored to sweep up the material proceeds of the crime rather than
fit the broad range of individuated circumstances of wrongdoers…’.38
Secondly Scott, in observing that the Gardaí and statutory agencies
prosecute offences in the lower courts, suggests the following: ‘This
diffusion is reminiscent of the earlier system in which prosecution
Lawyers are concerned to find continuities between past and present, while his-
torians employing…contextual or structuralist approaches will emphasise
discontinuous breaks, great epistemic shifts in the ways in which social actors con-
struct their worlds. R.W. Gordon, ‘Foreword: The Arrival of Critical Historicism’
Stanford Law Review (1997) 49: 1024-1025. 
37 Op. cit., 134.
38 Op. cit., 136.
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was a private matter for victims of crime to pursue’. Again we would
suggest that this is a present-centred, ahistorical view that fails to
take a proper account of the transformations that have taken place
in the criminal process as it relates to victims of crime. In the eigh-
teenth century, for example, the victim of a crime had much greater
ownership of the conflict. As we noted in Terrorism, Rights and the
Rule of Law:
‘In keeping with the local orientation of justice, the “paradigm of prose-
cution” in the eighteenth century rested on victims of crime…They were
the principal investigators of crime and the key decision-makers in the
prosecution process…As Bentham (1830: 427) disapprovingly noted:
“The law gives to the party injured, or rather to every prosecutor, a par-
tial power of pardon…in giving him the choice of the kind of action he
will commence…The lot of the offender depends not on the gravity of
his offence but on…the injured party…The judge is a puppet in the
hands of any prosecutor.’ Victims could elect not to invoke the law and
let the criminal act go” unpunished; they could engage in a personal set-
tlement or private retribution; or, they could prosecute but shape the
severity of any criminal charge (capital or non-capital) through their
interpretation of the facts…Conflicts remained the property of the parties
personally affected and this often involved recourse to informal dispute
settlement… If victims did proceed with a prosecution, it was their
energy, for the most part, that carried the case through the various pros-
ecution stages. Victims engaged in the fact finding, gathered witnesses,
prepared cases, presented evidence in court as examiners-in-chief, and
bore the costs involved.’39
In contrast, and as noted above, the story of criminal justice for much
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries might best be told as the
rise of institutionalised justice whereby the State gradually monop-
olised investigative and prosecutorial functions and colonised
‘ownership’ of the wrongfulness of criminal wrongdoing. This
entailed the steady development of an ‘equality of arms’ framework,
designed to offset the power vested in an increasingly Leviathan
State and offer some protections and safeguards to those accused of
crime. Justice increasingly became an institutionalised, centralised,
rule-bound reality, and decreasingly dependent on the victim’s
energy, needs, experiences or perspective as regards the alleged
39 Op. cit., 46-47.
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crime. This new institutional pattern quickly transcended the
victim’s interaction with the crime conflict and re-shaped how it was
presented, addressed, legitimated and concluded.
Within such a depersonalised, bureaucratised system, the victim
was displaced, confined largely to the bit-part role of reporting crime
and of adducing evidence in court as a witness, if needed. The
victim’s space for negotiation and participation in pursuing his or
her own interests was thus dismantled by an increasingly
State/accused centred logic of action. From being a cornerstone in
the regulation of relations concerning the conflict, victims increas-
ingly found their individual experiences (such a vital currency in the
pursuit of justice in the pre-modern era) assimilated into general
group will – the public interest. The latter was validated through the
institutional architecture of a criminal justice system whereas the
former was increasingly viewed as invalid knowledge given its par-
tiality, subjectivity, emotiveness and unconstrained dimensions,40 all
of which were filtered out by the operations of a justice system. In the
course of the nineteenth century, the individual victim’s experience
was increasingly rendered as part of the collective public interest and
packaged and presented in institutional terms. This marked the shift
from victim-mediated justice to bureaucratised State/accused medi-
ated justice.41
It is difficult in the circumstances to see how the current diffusion
in the power to prosecute crime equates with a reversion to a State
where the ‘paradigm of prosecution’ rests once again on the victim.
Even aside from the methodological flaws inherent in adopting a
linear (monist) interpretation of history, at a surface level it appears
entirely groundless to suggest that current practices equate with pri-
vate prosecutions of the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries.
Whether the Office of the DPP, the Gardaí, or the Office of the Direc-
tor of Corporate Enforcement (for example) prosecutes a crime, the
victim of the crime (if there is one) has still lost control over the con-
flict to an institutional apparatus, albeit an increasingly diffuse
institutional apparatus. 
40 J Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007),
309. 
41 For further analysis, see B Vaughan and S Kilcommins, ‘The Governance of
Crime and the Negotiation of Justice’, Criminology and Criminal Justice (forthcoming
2010).
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CONCLUSION
In the conclusion to our book, we wrote that there has been scant
consideration of the implications of the proliferation of regulatory
agencies. We currently lack an understanding of how the justice dis-
pensed by these distinctive bodies should best be arranged and
ordered as their criteria for decision-making are internally driven.
Of course, this is equally true of a body like the Gardaí but they are
more accountable now than they ever have been in the past to ensure
that people with whom they come into contact are treated fairly and
appropriately. 
This problem of ensuring a level of equality and proportionality
is one significant issue that emerges from the ‘dispersal of justice’.
Another issue is when the traditional criminal justice agencies, espe-
cially the police, begin to emulate regulatory tactics. Scott notes that
this may become an issue as ‘the integrity of the legal system may
be damaged’ but pays little attention to this possibility. We noted
some instances when prosecuting authorities wished to take ‘two
bites of the cherry’ proceeding against people through the civil as
well as the criminal process. In one relevant case, discussed in our
book, the Court of Criminal Appeal noted that ‘since proportionality
is a key principle of sentencing’, it was duty-bound to consider the
‘cumulative sum of penalties’ rather than in a disaggregated fashion
as dispensed by individual organisations. In contrast, judicial over-
sight of CAB has approved this kind of dual-track attack, allowing
for proceedings in rem and in personam with judicial approval. We
reiterate that we are not raising these issues to discredit the actions
of regulatory justice but merely to raise attention to some of the prob-
lematic issues that it brings.
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